Monday, August 19, 2019

Constitutional Paideia :: Hegel Constitutionalism Papers

Constitutional Paideia Constitutional paideia designates a form of constitutionalism that construes a nation’s constitution essentially in terms of ongoing processes of collective self-formation. This paper explores the notion of constitutional paideia as formulated by Hegel, who explicitly defines constitutionalism with categories of Bildung. The paper’s strategy is to present Hegel’ position in light of questions that can be raised about it. The paper advances three central theses: (1) in spite (and perhaps because) of his historico-culturist approach to law, Hegel is a theoretician of constitutional paideia; (2) despite construing constitutionalism in terms of ongoing processes of popular self-interpretation, Hegel does not vitiate the distinction between law and politics deemed so central to constitutional theory; and (3) despite construing constitutionalism in terms of self-formative processes of a particular culture, Hegel does not jettison the normativity and trans-contextualism long associated with modern constitutional theory. The paper concludes with some observations on the contemporary significance of Hegelian constitutionalism. Constitutional paideia is a term I shall use to designate a form of constitutionalism that construes a nation's constitution essentially in terms of ongoing processes of collective self-formation.(1) As such, it is markedly distinct from competing models. It is distinct from liberal models, notably represented today by John Rawls, for whom a constitution must "guarantee certain basic political rights and liberties and establish democratic procedures for moderating the political rivalry, and for determining issues of social policy."(2) While constitutional paideia is not chary of liberal concern for legal and moral constraints, it rejects the latter's commitment to entrenched rights and a fixed sense of a nation's legal-political identity. It is likewise distinct from communitarian models, represented however ambiguously by Frank Michelman. While sharing with such models a focus on communal identity, its commitment to processes of self-formation renders constitutional inhospitable to a theory keyed to a set of preexisting cultural values—that "more encompassing common life, bearing the imprint of a common past."(3) Constitutional paideia is distinct further from republican models, represented equally ambiguously by Hannah Arendt. Although it shares with republicanism the notion that constitutionalism must be sensitive to principles of public virtue, collective power, and civic commitment to a shared enterprise, it places special emphasis on the conditions for constituting collective identity and nationhood itself.(4) Constitutional paideia is also distinct from deliberative models, represented notably by JÃ ¼rgen Habermas, for whom "the constitution establishes political procedures according to which citizens, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, successfully pursue the cooperative project of establishing just (or more just) conditions of life.

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